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1 Introduction
Agglomerations grow faster and their labor productivity is higher compared to
less agglomerated areas. Looking at US states, Ciccone and Hall (1996) report a
6 percent increase in labor productivity upon a doubling of employment density.
Higher productivity is also evident in higher nominal wages: Glaeser and Mare
(2001) confirm the existence of an urban wage premium of about 33 percent across
US metropolitan areas; accounting for personal and job characteristics as well as
for unobserved ability still leaves a wage premium of over 20 percent. These
positive wage effects persist, even when workers leave an agglomeration. Hence,
human capital appears to be one of the sources of agglomeration economies.
This paper employs a model of a pooled labor market in order to explain
the productivity and wage premium typically found in agglomerations. Pooling
creates an advantage for both workers and firms as it improves matching and
facilitates adjustment to shocks, thus raising the return to human capital invest-
ment. Our paper adds to the existing literature by synthesizing the endogenous
formation of heterogeneous skills and labor market pooling.
A labor market pooling advantage arises as the result of a portfolio effect and
a matching effect. The matching effect of pooling refers to the complementarity of
workers’ specific skills and firms’ skill requirements. As the average skill distance
between workers and firms decreases in an agglomeration, so does the degree of
mismatch. As regards the portfolio effect, a pooled labor market protects both
firms and workers against demand uncertainty. The portfolio benefit will be
higher the lower the correlation of demand shocks.
Our model builds upon the idea that human capital has both a general and
a specific component, as expressed in Kim (1989).1 In a series of papers, Kim
(1989, 1990, 1991) studies the impact of local labor market size on wages and
human capital formation. Adapting the Salop model of product differentiation
to the labor market, Kim (1989) shows that wages rise and workers invest more
in specific human capital as the market is enlarged. Following his approach, we
model human capital formation in an imperfectly competitive and pooled local
labor market. We then introduce price uncertainty on firms’ product markets
which influences the labor market outcome. In anticipation of firm behavior and
1Kim refers to specific human capital as intensive, and to general human capital as extensive.
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price uncertainty, workers choose between specializing into a certain type of skills
and accumulating general skills. We thus look at the endogenous determination
of of both specific and general human capital under product market uncertainty.
The distinction between general and specific human capital allows us to cap-
ture two important aspects of labor market pooling: increased match quality
and risk reduction. While investments into specific skills improve a worker’s
productivity if matched with the appropriate technology, general skills increase
a worker’s flexibility, i.e. her ability to retrain and adjust to a change in skill
requirements.
Empirical support for this argument is provided by Glaeser and Saiz (2004):
having first identified education as an important ingredient into agglomeration
economies, they find evidence for a causation running from skills to growth, the
mechanism being increased productivity (at the metropolitan area level). Their
finding that skills matter most in declining cities supports the so called Reinven-
tion City View, according to which skills are important for a city’s adjustment
to negative shocks. Human capital therefore increases the flexibility of the local
work force and thus helps a region and its firms to better adjust to shocks in
demand or technology. The adaptive nature of skills is also emphasized in Iyigun
and Owen (2006): Within the framework of a growth model, education produces
adaptive skills which increase the future adaptability of the workforce in an envi-
ronment characterized by frequent technological change. This, in turn, increases
the resources devoted to R&D and therefore the rate of technical change.
We will proceed as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the related liter-
ature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 derives labor market equilibria
and analyzes workers’ optimal investments into human capital. In section 5, we
discuss a particular specification of our model where additional restrictions gen-
erate unemployment. We derive and discuss empirical predictions of our analysis
in section 6. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Empirical studies on the existence and extent of agglomeration economies, par-
ticularly those that estimate production functions, are surveyed in Rosenthal and
Strange (2001, 2004). These studies typically focus on the industrial scope of ag-
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glomeration economies. Another strand of the literature focusses on the relation-
ship between agglomeration and employment growth (e.g. Henderson, Kuncoro,
and Turner, 1995; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003) or wages (e.g. Glaeser and Mare,
2001). All studies confirm the existence of positive agglomeration economies.
As regards the sources of agglomeration economies, most of the studies inves-
tigate the role of knowledge spillovers and the evidence suggests that knowledge
spillovers do exist but vanish quickly with distance (Audretsch and Feldman,
2004; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993). However, the strongest evidence
is available for labor market pooling: Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser (2002) an-
alyze agglomeration economies at different levels of geographical aggregation.
They find knowledge spillovers to occur only at the metropolitan level, input
sharing to occur at the metropolitan and more so at the state level, and evidence
in favor of labor market pooling at all levels of aggregation. Wheeler (2006)
and Yankow (2006) confirm the existence of a wage growth effect following job
changes, which supports a matching or coordination efficiency explanation of ag-
glomeration economies.
Krugman (1991) presents an early formal treatment of labor market pooling
and points out the advantage of a pooled labor market in the reduction of risk:
workers benefit from lower income risk, firms from the availability of workers if
they wish to respond to a positive demand shock. A different benefit of pooling,
namely improved matching, is emphasized in Helsley and Strange (1990), who
incorporate labor market heterogeneity into a general equilibrium model of a sys-
tem of cities. With cities’ population growth being determined endogenously over
migration, the labor market can be shown to generate agglomeration economies
as both workers and firms expect to be better matched in larger cities.
Strange, Hejazi, and Tang (2006) present a model that combines uncertainty
and the matching problem: Firms with a particular but uncertain resource need
find it easier to respond to the uncertainty if there is a wider range of resource
suppliers in the local market. Conversely, resource suppliers prefer to locate
where more downstream firms are active. Agglomeration increases the expected
match quality in the face of uncertainty. Similarly, Wheeler (2001) argues that
with heterogeneous skills and skill requirements, a larger market enables greater
sorting. Consequently, urban markets exhibit both higher productivity and higher
wages.
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Other models of labor market pooling analyze the location decision of firms,
see for example Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2005) and Combes and Du-
ranton (2006). The latter emphasize the close relationship between pooling and
knowledge spillovers as joint determinants of the location decision. Agglomer-
ation is the result of a trade-off between the benefits and costs of pooling: the
former arise from the knowledge that a poached worker brings to her new em-
ployer, the latter consist of higher wages that a firm has to pay in order to retain
and attract workers. As the product market approaches perfect competition,
firms eventually choose to locate in separate labor markets as the costs of higher
wages outweigh the benefits of spillovers. Hence, Combes and Duranton (2006)
demonstrate how the intensity of competition on product markets can be linked
to labor market outcomes.
Kim (1990), Rotemberg and Saloner (2000), and Picard and Toulemonde
(2004) consider human capital investments in pooled labor markets, focussing
on the benefits of larger markets. In Kim (1990), the average skill distance be-
tween workers and firms decreases as cities grow. With lower costs of mismatch
workers face a stronger incentive to invest in human capital. Rotemberg and
Saloner (2000) demonstrate that competition among firms for trained individuals
ensures workers with the appropriate return on their human capital investment.
Picard and Toulemonde (2004) model a pooled labor market with endogenous
human capital formation. With more firms in the local market, the range of
abilities in demand is extended and so a worker’s probability of finding a perfect
match increases. An implication of the model is that more general education,
by expanding the range of abilities of a worker, improves the matching and thus
fosters spatial dispersion of industry.
Finally, Kim and Mohtadi (1992) formalize a dynamic effect of pooling: Eco-
nomic growth is determined from ever increasing specialization under the as-
sumption of constant population growth. With more workers and firms in the
market, matching is improved. This encourages further specialization by workers
and generates ongoing growth.
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3 The Model
We consider a local labor market composed of a mass of workers normalized to
unity and two firms competing for these workers. Firms produce for a market
that is subject to random price fluctuations. Before entering the labor market,
workers decide on their human capital investment in anticipation of future labor
market outcomes. Both workers and firms are risk-neutral and maximize expected
income and profits, respectively.
3.1 Workers
A worker’s human capital is characterized by a specific, worker-innate skill, s ≥ 0,
as well as a general (x > 0) and a specific (y > 0) component. In her investment
decision, a worker only chooses the latter two components, while her skill is
predetermined and private information. Let y be the amount of output produced
by a worker. Hence, specific human capital directly determines productivity in
the production process. In contrast, general human capital helps the worker to
adapt her skills to the specific needs of the employer. If her skill s differs from the
employer’s skill requirement s∗ a worker has to bear adjustment costs ca which
general human capital helps to reduce. We assume the following specification of
adjustment costs: ca(s, s∗) = |s− s∗|/x. Human capital formation is costly, too.
For simplicity we use the functional form ch(x, y) = α(x2 + y2)/2, where α > 0
will be assumed large enough to ensure the existence of optimal solutions.
Workers are confronted with two kinds of uncertainty: First, when making
their investment decision, workers do not know how far in terms of skills they
are apart from their prospective employers. We assume that skills s are dis-
tributed uniformly over [0, S] with density S. Only after human capital decisions
have been made will the ordering of skills relative to prospective employers be
revealed to workers. This kind of uncertainty captures the effect of technological
developments which affect production structures.2 The average distance between
2For example, a student in IT might specialize in a specific programming language, not
knowing whether this or some other language will be demanded by his future employer. Ex
ante, various programming languages might be equally important. Similarly, law students have
to specialize at some point of their studies, without knowing for sure what they are going to
need most in their future job.
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a worker and a firm can be interpreted as the degree of mismatch in the local
labor market. The second uncertainty is with respect to firms’ labor demand, as
product market conditions are changing (see below). Expectations over mismatch
and demand will influence workers’ investment decisions which in turn will affect
labor market outcomes.
3.2 Product Market
When selling their products to the markets, the two firms face stochastic price
realizations. We assume that the output price for firm i ∈ {1, 2}, p˜i > 0 fluctuates
around the expected value E[p˜i] = p with variance σ
2
p, the distribution of both
prices being identical. Although the two firms produce for different markets,
we allow for some dependence in demand which is captured by the correlation
coefficient ρ ∈ [−1, 1] of the two prices. Price realizations are observed by all
agents. Prices determine productivity and firms compete in the labor market.
The introduction of stochastic prices allows us to analyze the link between
product market uncertainty, labor demand and human capital investment deci-
sions. In the model, the correlation coefficient indicates to what extent firms
depend on common factors. Higher correlations might be due to firms being in
similar industries. However, often different industries depend on common factors
(such as energy prices or prices of raw materials). Additionally, firms within the
same industry may be affected by idiosyncratic shocks to different degrees. We
therefore use a general notion of local diversification (specialization): a market
can be considered diversified (specialized) the lower (higher) the correlation of
firms’ product market prices.
Apart from the demand shock interpretation, our analysis can also be applied
to markets where firms differ in their innovation rates. If process innovation is
an important feature of local industries, then a firm may turn a successful inno-
vation into a productive advantage. Higher productivity temporarily increases
the firm’s labor demand and its market power, until rival innovations, knowl-
edge spillovers, or the expiry of related patents level out productivity differences
between competitors. In a low-technology industrial environment with little in-
novative activity, the probability that external factors affect firms’ productivity
jointly is much higher. In this sense, higher (lower) correlation of prices may also
be interpreted as a local environment with lower (higher) innovation rates.
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3.3 Labor Market
We consider two firms which differ in their production technology in the sense
that they require workers of different skills. The two firms’ technologies are
characterized by maximum differentiation. We order worker skills according to
their closeness to firm 1’s required skill: s = 0 denotes the skill that matches
firm 1’s (firm 2’s) demand perfectly (least), whereas s = S is the worst (perfect)
skill-match for firm 1 (firm 2). By definition of skill space and ordering, the two
firms are located at the endpoints of line S which represents the skill space. The
length of that line can then be interpreted as the degree of worker heterogeneity. A
smaller S means that firms become more similar in terms of their technologies and
skill requirements, and that the average distance (and hence mismatch) between
a worker and the nearest firm decreases. The fixed mass of workers is then
distributed over a smaller interval.
The two firms are unable to observe a worker’s innate skill. Given that work-
ers do not know their relative skill position in advance, they all form the same
expectations and hence choose the same level of human capital. As a result,
firms cannot use human capital as a signal of skill.3 This reduces firms’ strategies
to offering the same wage to all workers and let them incur the (unobservable)
adjustment costs. Workers will then sort themselves to the firm with the highest
wage offer net of adjustment costs. Our model of wage competition is thus equiv-
alent to price competition within the well-known Hotelling model.4 Similar to
the reservation price assumption in the product market version, workers require
a non-negative wage.
Our assumption about firms’ locations at the endpoints of line S and the
a-priori non-observability of their relative positions along S for workers is less
restrictive than it seems. One could imagine the set of skills to be a circle of
circumference 2S where the two firms’ location choice follows workers’ human
capital decisions. In the spirit of the analysis by Kats (1995), one can show that
there exist sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with maximum
differentiation between the two firms. Since we are looking at an application of
3Similarly, workers are unable to reveal their skills otherwise, as they will all be tempted to
announce the skill which promises them the highest wage, as long as skills are non-verifiable.
4For example, see Hotelling (1929), Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992) or Bester,
De Palma, Leininger, Thomas, and Von Thadden (1996).
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this type of model, we take locations as given. However, in order to ensure
our market equilibrium comprises both firms, we impose the following parameter
restriction:
max[p˜i − p˜j] <
3S
xy
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j . (1)
Technically, this ensures a labor market equilibrium where both firms employ a
positive mass of workers even in the case where the price difference reaches its
maximum value (max[p˜i − p˜j ]). Furthermore, the condition ensures that no firm
will find it profitable to drive its competitor out of the market.
Another parameter restriction is given by the participation constraint of work-
ers, as we will first consider only full employment equilibria. As long as
min p˜i ≥
3S
2xy
for i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
is fulfilled, all workers are employed in equilibrium even when both firms realize
their lowest possible prices. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of our model. In
Workers
observe s
and choose
x and y
Firms’
skill re-
quirements
and prices
revealed
Firms post
wages
Workers
decide on
employ-
ment
Production
and
payoffs
realized
Figure 1: Time line
the following section, we will solve the model, starting with the derivation of the
labor market equilibrium.
4 Full Employment Analysis
4.1 Labor Market Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the local labor market consists of a pair of wages, w1 and w2,
and the allocation of workers to firms. With full employment in equilibrium, the
marginal worker of skill sˆ who is indifferent between working for firm 1 and firm
2 can be derived from w1 −
sˆ
x
= w2 −
S−sˆ
x
:
sˆ(w1, w2) =
S
2
+
x
2
(w1 − w2) . (3)
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Workers within [0, sˆ] then constitute firm 1’s labor supply, those within [sˆ, S]
choose to work for firm 2. Then, profits of the two firms can be given depending
on prices and wages:
pi1(w1, w2) =
sˆ(w1, w2)
S
(p˜1y − w1) and (4)
pi2(w1, w2) =
S − sˆ(w1, w2)
S
(p˜2y − w2) . (5)
Partial differentiation with respect to own wages results in the individual reaction
function of firm i
wi(wj) =
p˜iy + wj
2
−
S
2x
(6)
which then leads to the equilibrium (Bertrand) wage of firm i
wBi =
2p˜i + p˜j
3
y −
S
x
(7)
and the equilibrium marginal worker
sˆB =
xy
6
(p˜1 − p˜2) +
S
2
. (8)
Two conditions have to be fulfilled for this equilibrium to exist for all price re-
alizations: First, the marginal worker has to be within [0, S]; this condition is
ensured by restriction (1). Second, the marginal worker has to receive a non-
negative net wage even when price realizations for both firms are at their lowest
level; condition (2) ensures this.
4.2 Labor Market Pooling
Our set-up allows a worker’s productivity to differ between firms, hence equilib-
rium wages and employment can be asymmetric. We now show how our model
thus captures advantages from labor market pooling for both firms and workers.
Consider workers first. Wages are uncertain in two respects: One kind of
uncertainty refers to a worker’s position in skill space relative to the two firms.
The other concerns her productivity as prices have not been realized. Hence, the
expected net wage of a worker is:
E[wT ] = Ep˜
[
sˆ
S
(w1 − Es≤sˆ[c
a
1(s)]) +
S − sˆ
S
(w2 −Es>sˆ[c
a
2(s)])
]
. (9)
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The outer expectations are taken with respect to prices. The first term within
brackets captures the expected net wage of a worker at firm 1, weighted by
the probability of employment there. As the worker’s position within [0, sˆ] is
uncertain, expectations with respect to s, too, have to be formed (while sˆ still
depends on price realizations). The second term captures the same probability
weighted payoff to the worker in case she is employed at firm 2.
By symmetry, expected profits of the two firms are equal and only depend
on the realization of prices. They can thus be derived for example from firm 1
profits
E[pi1] = Ep˜
[
sˆ
S
(p˜1y − w1)
]
. (10)
Inserting equilibrium wages and employment from (7) and (8) into (9) and (10)
yields our first set of results.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium in the labor market is characterized as follows:
1. the expected payoffs of workers and firms and the expected total surplus are,
respectively:
E[wT ] = py −
5S
4x
+
xy2
18S
σ2p(1− ρ) (11)
E[pii] =
S
2x
+
xy2
9S
σ2p(1− ρ) (12)
E[TS] = py −
S
4x
+
5xy2
18S
σ2p(1− ρ) . (13)
2. all expected payoffs decrease in price correlation, ρ, and (weakly) increase
in price uncertainty, σ2p (portfolio effect);
3. expected wages and total surplus decrease in skill differentiation, S (match-
ing effect).
In equilibrium, the labor market features two pooling effects, a portfolio and a
matching effect. The latter is also present in other models of local labor markets
such as Thisse and Zenou (2000) or Hamilton, Thisse, and Zenou (2000). Mis-
match arises from worker-firm pairs with differing skill supply and requirement
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and is reflected in the adjustment costs. In a more agglomerated area, there ex-
ists a greater number of firms and a finer division of labor among them. In our
setting, this is captured by firms being closer in terms of their skill requirements
(smaller S). This implies that the costs of worker-firm mismatch decrease, thus
raising overall productivity in the market. However, a finer division of labor also
increases the competitive pressure on the labor market, as firms compete for less
heterogeneous workers. Thus, workers reap the benefits in the form of higher
wages, while firms’ profits may decrease.5
The portfolio effect arises even under our assumption of risk neutrality. It is
generated by the combination of labor market flexibility and asymmetries in firms’
productivity. The ability of firms to adjust employment and wages allows them
to shift employment from the less to the more productive firm. This improves
employment efficiency and benefits firms. Part of this gain, however, is transferred
to the workers as firms compete in wages. Hence, all market participants gain
from (expected) employment adjustments following productivity shocks. These
advantages only occur for less-than-perfect price correlations (ρ < 1). They
decrease with correlation and increase with uncertainty (higher σ2p).
4.3 Human Capital Formation
We now turn to analyzing workers’ choice of human capital investment in the
first stage of the model. The maximization problem of an individual worker is
max
x,y
E[wT ]− ch . (14)
Focussing on interior solutions to this problem, we can state our next result.
Proposition 2 Workers’ optimal human capital investments, x∗ and y∗, have
the following properties:
1. general and specific human capital are complements, as long as ρ < 1;
2. both types of human capital increase in the expected product price, p, as long
as ρ < 1;
5The overall effect of S on profits is ambiguous: Firms also benefit from a smaller segment
size as it increases the relative importance of asymmetric labor market outcomes in firm profits.
For sufficiently low correlation and sufficiently high uncertainty, profits may increase when S
falls.
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3. both types of human capital decrease in price correlation, ρ;
4. both types of human capital increase in price uncertainty, σ2p, as long as
ρ < 1;
5. specific human capital decreases in skill differentiation, S.
The first interesting result in proposition 2 is that the two types of human
capital complement each other even tough they are independent of each other in
both the productivity and the costs of investment. This complementarity is due
to the portfolio effect: for perfectly correlated prices (ρ = 1), both types of human
capital would be independent. As a consequence, a region and its workforce can
therefore be both highly productive and flexible. This complementarity of human
capital types induced by the portfolio effect also drives the subsequent results in
proposition 2. Higher expected productivity (p) directly raises the value of specific
human capital. Complementarity then raises the returns to both types of human
capital even further, such that the overall effect on both types is positive. Price
uncertainty and price correlation directly influence the degree of employment
adjustment in response to asymmetric prices. As this turnover positively affects
the expected wage, both types of human capital are higher in a more diversified
and uncertain market.
The effect of skill differentiation S on human capital levels is more complex as
the matching and portfolio effects interact. Without the portfolio effect (ρ = 1),
an increase in worker heterogeneity would exacerbate the degree of mismatch
in the labor market. As general human capital can alleviate this effect, workers
would be expected to increase their general human capital. At the same time, the
benefit of diversification and turnover decreases with greater skill differentiation.
Hence, the benefit of both types of human capital captured in the portfolio effect
decreases, inducing lower investments into human capital. While the latter effect
is unambiguous with respect to specific human capital, the overall effect on general
human capital is indeterminate.
In sum, our results suggest two channels for higher human capital in a local
labor market. First, a more diverse composition of firms raises the return to both
types of human capital. Second, more agglomerated markets with higher division
of labor among firms increase the return to specific human capital.
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5 The Impact of Unemployment
So far we have assumed full employment. However, unemployment is a persistent
phenomenon in today’s industrialized economies. This section shows how the
possibility of unemployment affects human capital formation. Specifically, we will
allow for some price realizations to be sufficiently low to induce unemployment
(see Thisse and Zenou, 2000; Jellal, Thisse, and Zenou, 2005). Hence, we now
consider a market where (temporary) drops in productivity may be quite severe.
5.1 Model Adjustments
In order to simplify the analysis, we now assume a specific shock structure. A
firm faces either of two price realizations, p˜i ∈ {p − ε; p + ε}, ε ∈ [0; p), which
occur with equal probability (hence, σ2p = ε
2). Consequently, there are only four
possible combinations of the two firms’ prices. Given our symmetry assumptions,
we can define the probabilities for these realizations as follows:
Prob[p˜1 = p˜2 = p+ ε] =
1+ρ
4
= Prob[p˜1 = p˜2 = p− ε]
Prob[p˜1 = p+ ε, p˜2 = p− ε] =
1−ρ
4
= Prob[p˜1 = p− ε, p˜2 = p+ ε] .
(15)
As before, ρ captures the correlation between the two prices and thus determines
the probability of symmetric versus asymmetric prices.
We introduce unemployment by assuming that for low price realizations, the
skill distance between the two firms is sufficiently large to let distant workers’
productivity fall below their reservation wage:
(p− ε)y −
S
x
< 0 . (16)
This restriction ensures that in case of low price realizations at both firms, wages
will be depressed to the extent that some workers in the middle of the skill
space [0, S] would earn a negative net wage. At the same time, we continue
to assume that both firms are active and that there is full employment in the
other three price combinations (high prices for both or asymmetric prices). The
former assumption still holds by condition (1), the latter requires the following
restriction instead of (2):
p ≥
3S
2xy
. (17)
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Overall, these parameter restrictions constrain both the extent of price fluctuation
and the level of expected prices from above and below:6
ε ∈
(
p− S
xy
, 3S
2xy
)
and (18)
p ∈
[
3S
2xy
, 5S
2xy
)
. (19)
With the above adjustments in place, we now reconsider the labor market equi-
libria.
5.2 Labor Market Equilibria
By conditions (1) and (17) our analysis from the previous section holds as long as
at least one firm’s price realization is high. Hence, for three of our four possible
cases, the results for equilibrium wages and employment are given by (7) and (8),
respectively. Hence, it suffices to focus on the case of low price realizations for
both firms. In this case, the two firms act as monopsonists in their segment of
the labor market as workers’ alternative is the (zero) reservation wage.
Consider firm 1’s wage setting (firm 2’s decision is symmetric). The marginal
worker accepting a wage offer w1 is indifferent between the net wage and the
reservation wage: w1 −
sˆ1
x
= 0. Firm 1 thus faces the labor supply function
sˆ1(w1) = w1x . (20)
Firm 1’s profits are then pi1(w1) =
sˆ(w1)
S
((p − ε)y − w1) and maximizing them
yields the following (monopsony) wage offer
wM =
y
2
(p− ε) (21)
and its marginal worker at
sˆM1 =
y
2
x(p− ε) . (22)
Restriction (16) implies that some workers in the middle of the labor market
segment do not accept the wage offer. It ensures that the two firms can act
monopsonistically and that workers with s ∈ [sˆM1 , S − sˆ
M
1 ] remain unemployed.
6These restrictions are necessary to exclude a case of intermediate productivity that leads
to a rather peculiar equilibrium, as already noted by Salop (1979).
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Finally, the expected wage of a worker (with respect to his skill position s) in the
case of low price realizations for both firms equals
E[wM ] =
1
4S
(p− ε)2y2x . (23)
Before reconsidering human capital investments, it is worth pointing out two
aspects of the scenario considered here: First, the combination of low productivity
and the existence of outside options (for example due to unemployment benefits)
causes unemployment in this version of the model. Second, an outside option has
ambiguous effects for the average worker as it provides a safety net at the cost
of granting firms monopsony power. It is only for very low levels of productivity
that the overall effect on expected wages is positive in comparison with a market
where no outside option exists.
5.3 Human Capital Formation Reconsidered
To analyze human capital formation, we need to re-calculate the expected wage
of a worker, taking now into consideration the four possible cases. This yields
E[wT ] =
1 + ρ
4
(
(p+ ε)y −
5S
4x
+
1
4S
(p− ε)2y2x)
)
+
1− ρ
2
(
py −
5S
4x
+
1
9S
ε2y2x
)
(24)
which is the probability-weighted sum of the expected wage for symmetric price
realizations plus the expected wage for asymmetric realizations. While this ex-
pression features some of the terms familiar from the expected wage equation in
the full employment setting, unemployment now introduces an additional com-
plementarity between the two types of human capital: even for perfectly aligned
prices (ρ = 1), the two types reinforce their positive effect on wages by the re-
duction of unemployment.
As before, a worker solves the optimization problem
max
x,y
E[wT ]− ch (25)
in order to determine her human capital investments.
Proposition 3 In the model with unemployment, workers’ optimal human cap-
ital investments, x∗ and y∗, have the following properties:
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1. general and specific human capital are complements;
2. both types of human capital increase in the expected product price, p;
3. both types of human capital decrease in price correlation, ρ;
4. specific human capital decreases in skill differentiation, S.
These results are very similar to those of the basic model without unemploy-
ment. The main difference is that the effect of uncertainty (here captured by the
extent of the price fluctuation ε) is now ambiguous. While uncertainty in the
base model simply increases the scope of employment adjustments, it now also
raises the level of unemployment in case of negative shocks for both firms. Hence,
uncertainty now also carries a cost as unemployment destroys the value of any
human capital investment. This cost of uncertainty is an important feature of
the extension as it stresses a negative effect of uncertainty not captured in the
model with full employment.
Additionally, the results on human capital complementarity and the (related)
effect of the product price are reinforced in proposition 3. Unemployment thus
provides an additional mechanism to link the different types of human capital.
In sum, the introduction of unemployment into the base model strengthens our
key results.
6 Discussion
6.1 Empirical Implications
Our analysis highlights the role of labor market pooling in generating agglomer-
ation economies via human capital formation. The pooling mechanism is based
on the interaction between the local labor market and product market character-
istics. This setting is captured by two exogenous variables: less than perfectly
correlated demand fluctuations which give rise to the portfolio effect, and the de-
gree of skill differentiation which determines the extent of mismatch in the labor
market. In the following, we derive some empirical predictions that arise from
our model.
17
H1: Aggregate productivity, wages and firm profits increase the less correlated
the demand fluctuations.
H2: Wages increase the lower the degree of skill differentiation.
Pooling raises productivity, profits and wages via the portfolio effect (H1):
it improves the allocation of labor such that specific human capital is employed
more effectively. As specific skills become more similar and the average degree
of mismatch is reduced, net wages will rise in the face of lower adjustment costs
(H2); the impact of mismatch on firms’ profits, however, is ambiguous.
H1 and H2 capture short-run, static effects of pooling. The following two
hypotheses consider the longer run where pooling also affects human capital ac-
cumulation.
H3: General and specific human capital of a local workforce are higher the less
correlated the demand fluctuations.
H4: General and specific human capital are complements; complementarity rises
the less correlated the demand fluctuations.
As wages increase due to the pooling advantage this raises the return to both
types of human capital, so incentives to invest in specific and in general skills
improve (H3). As a worker becomes more productive, it pays to invest in general
skills which help to adapt her specific skills to a new technology. Conversely, if
flexibility is high, it pays to become more productive for flexibility to be rewarded
(H4).
The results for H1 and H2 imply that in a pooled local labor market, we
would expect to see higher wages and higher productivity in those industries that
experience asymmetric demand shocks more often and at the same time have sim-
ilar skill requirements. To test for the mismatch effect (H2), the degree of skill
differentiation in a labor market may be proxied by the degree of occupational
diversification. Wheaton and Lewis (2002) analyze the role of labor markets in
generating increasing returns in agglomerations. Using two different measures
of localization, the specialization of employment in terms of occupation and in-
dustry, they test for the idea that externalities based on human capital should
be linked to “own” industry and occupational employment. Occupational spe-
cialization for a sample of manufacturing employment in US SMAs is found to
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yield a wage premium of 23 percent. This finding supports a thick market in-
terpretation corresponding to H2. Duranton and Puga (2005) arrive at a similar
result: They report increased employment in managerial and executive functions
relative to production employment in urban areas as evidence of functional urban
specialization.
Testing for the portfolio effect (H1) requires capturing demand fluctuations,
and in particular their correlation. If we assume that demand shocks are mainly
industry-specific, a measure of industrial diversity can serve as a proxy for the
correlation of demand shocks. Wheaton and Lewis (2002) consider industrial
diversity and find that wage increases due to industry specialization are even more
pronounced than those due to occupational specialization. At first, this finding
seems in contrast with the role we attach to (industry) diversification. However,
our approach requires that firms be able to share their labor input, so they should
not be too far apart in terms of skill requirements. Perfectly uncorrelated demand
fluctuations will not produce a portfolio effect if skill requirements are so different
that labor cannot easily move between firms of different industries. Consequently,
a simple specialization index as is typically used when testing for the existence
of localization versus urbanization economies might not suffice in our context.
Additionally, the assumption of industry-specific shocks may not hold if local
firms, even though belonging to different industries, are vertically linked and
thus subject to the same demand shocks. This would then result in nearly perfect
correlation of shocks. Our approach thus calls for a more detailed look into the
nature of shocks, possibly a decomposition of demand fluctuations into industry-
and firm-specific components.
Overman and Puga (2009) provide an example for a more detailed analysis of
fluctuations. The authors consider absolute deviations in plant-level employment
changes from the industry employment change. Averaging across time and plants
in an industry yields a measure of“idiosyncratic volatility”for firms within a given
sector. Adapting the approach to cover local idiosyncratic volatility, ideally at
the occupational level, should capture the nature of fluctuations which form the
basis for our results.
Testing for hypotheses H3 and H4 requires more detailed information about
workers’ human capital. So far, we are not aware of any study linking human
capital investment decisions to labor market pooling.
19
Labor mobility within a local labor market and across related sectors and
occupations might provide a further road along which our model can be indirectly
tested, since such mobility indicates a pooling mechanism at work. For example,
Bleakley and Lin (2006) analyze whether thick markets increase the returns to
matching and therefore provide additional incentives for workers to invest in
occupation and/or industry-specific skills. Although the focus of their analysis is
not on human capital formation, their finding of an increase in sectoral transitions
with higher education is consistent with the mechanisms underlying hypothesis
H3.
Finally, our results may be used for further economic conjectures. In our
model, a lower correlation in demand fluctuations implies higher human capi-
tal levels. Provided human capital serves as a major source of economic growth
(Lucas, 1988), an increase in human capital can be expected to have dynamic,
long-term effects: We would expect to see higher growth in local wages, pro-
ductivity and profits in markets where demand fluctuations are less correlated.
Lower correlations in demand fluctuations thus permanently affect labor market
outcomes and increase local differences over time. This is consistent with Glaeser
and Mare (2001) who explain the urban wage premium by both a a level as well
as a growth effect. Closer analyses linking the wage growth effect to employment
or product market fluctuations should yield more information about the nature
of labor market pooling effects.
7 Conclusion
Agglomerations with a pooled labor market enjoy two advantages: protection
against (asymmetric) shocks and lower mismatch. These advantages raise pro-
ductivity and are higher if there is a diverse set of firms requiring a similar set
of skills. A more efficient allocation of labor and reduced mismatch raise firms’
profits as well as wages. With higher wages workers find it worthwhile to accu-
mulate more human capital. Our analysis also predicts that directly productive
human capital and adaptive skills are complements. In the long-run, therefore,
the workforce in a pooled labor market will not only be more productive but also
more flexible in adapting to fluctuations and technological change. Moreover,
human capital will augment the pooling advantage: the more skilled the local
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work force, the more pronounced are the benefits of employment adjustments.
We show that pooling provides a tool that protects regions against imperfectly
correlated shocks to labor demand. As the paper by Magnani (2001) reveals,
workers are able to anticipate the risk of demand shocks to their own industry and
to respond by changing to jobs in other industries. Such inter-sectoral mobility
is then shown to be rising in education. Haskel, Kersley, and Martin (1997)
also show that firms, if given the ability to deploy their workforce as they wish,
respond to changes in demand by adjusting employment, rather than by adjusting
hours or prices or by labor hoarding. We therefore suggest policy measures which
rely upon and strengthen such individual responses by removing obstacles to
occupational and sectoral labor mobility and by improving education.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
1. Inserting equilibrium wages and employment from (7) and (8) into (9) and
(10) yields:
• For the expected wage:
E[wT ] = E
[
sˆB
S
(wB1 −
sˆB
2x
) +
S − sˆB
S
(wB2 −
S − sˆB
2x
)
]
(26)
= E[p˜1]y −
5S
4x
+
xy2
18S
(
E[p˜21]−E[p˜1p˜2]
)
(27)
= py −
5S
4x
+
xy2
18S
σ2p(1− ρ) (28)
where use is made of E[p˜1] = E[p˜2] = p, σ
2
p = V ar[p˜i] = E[p˜
2
i ] −
(E[p˜i])
2, Cov[p˜1, p˜2] = E[p˜1p˜2]− (E[p˜i])
2 and ρ = Cov[p˜1,p˜2]
V ar[p˜i]
.
• For expected profits:
E[pi1] = E
[
sˆB
S
(p˜1y − w
B
1 )
]
(29)
=
S
2x
+
xy2
9S
(
E[p˜21]−E[p˜1p˜2]
)
(30)
=
S
2x
+
xy2
9S
σ2p(1− ρ) (31)
• For expected total surplus, by adding up:
E[TS] = E[wT ] + 2E[pii] (32)
= py −
S
4x
+
5xy2
18S
σ2p(1− ρ) (33)
2. Inspection of the above results yields dE[w
T ]
dρ
< 0, dE[pii]
dρ
< 0 and dE[TS]
dρ
< 0,
as well as dE[w
T ]
dσ2p
≥ 0, dE[pii]
dσ2p
≥ 0 and dE[TS]
dσ2p
≥ 0.
3. Inspection of the above results yields dE[w
T ]
dS
< 0 and dE[TS]
dS
< 0.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
The worker maximizes:
φ(x, y) ≡ E[wT ]− ch = py −
5S
4x
+
xy2
18S
σ2p(1− ρ)−
α
2
(x2 + y2) (34)
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Let φi denote the partial derivative of φ with respect to i, and φij its cross-
partial derivative with respect to i and j. Then, the first order conditions for the
optimum human capital investments are
φy ≡ p+
xy
9S
σ2p(1− ρ)− αy = 0 (35)
and
φx ≡
5S
4x2
+
y2
18S
σ2p(1− ρ)− αx = 0 (36)
Additionally, the following second order conditions have to be satisfied:
φyy ≡
x
9S
σ2p(1− ρ)− α < 0 , (37)
φxx ≡ −
5S
2x3
− α < 0 (38)
and
φyyφxx − (φyx)
2 > 0 (39)
where φyx ≡
y
9S
σ2p(1− ρ) ≥ 0.
1. Complementarity of x and y follows from φyx > 0 for ρ < 1.
2. Total differentiation of (35) and (36) with respect to x, y and p yields
dy
dp
=
−φypφxx + φxpφyx
φyyφxx − (φyx)2
> 0 (40)
and
dx
dp
=
−φxpφyy + φypφyx
φyyφxx − (φyx)2
≥ 0 (41)
where φyp = 1 and φxp = 0. The signs follow immediately.
3. Total differentiation of (35) and (36) with respect to x, y and ρ yields
dy
dρ
=
−φyρφxx + φxρφyx
φyyφxx − (φyx)2
< 0 (42)
and
dx
dρ
=
−φxρφyy + φyρφyx
φyyφxx − (φyx)2
< 0 (43)
where φyρ = −
xy
9S
σ2p < 0 and φxρ = −
y2
18S
σ2p < 0. The signs follow immedi-
ately.
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4. Total differentiation of (35) and (36) with respect to x, y and σp yields
dy
dσp
=
−φyσpφxx + φxσpφyx
φyyφxx − (φyx)2
≥ 0 (44)
and
dx
dσp
=
−φxσpφyy + φyσpφyx
φyyφxx − (φyx)2
≥ 0 (45)
where φyσp =
2xy
9S
σp(1 − ρ) ≥ 0 and φxσp =
y
9S
σp(1 − ρ) ≥ 0. The signs
follow immediately and inequalities are strict for ρ < 1.
5. Total differentiation of (35) and (36) with respect to x, y and S yields
dy
dS
=
−φySφxx + φxSφyx
φyyφxx − (φyx)2
≤ 0 (46)
where φyS = −
xy
9S2
σ2p(1 − ρ) ≤ 0 and φxS =
5
4x2
− y
2
18S2
σ2p(1 − ρ). Now the
sign of dy
dS
is not obvious. However, rearranging the numerator yields
−φySφxx + φxSφyx = −σ
2
p(1− ρ)
(
α
xy
9S2
+
5y
36Sx2
+
y3
162S3
σ2p(1− ρ)
)
≤ 0 (47)
such that dy
dS
≤ 0 is confirmed.
A.3 Proof of proposition 3
The proof is structurally similar to the proof of proposition 2. Now, the worker
maximizes:
ψ(x, y) ≡ E[wT ]− ch =
1 + ρ
4
(
(p+ ε)y −
5S
4x
+
1
4S
(p− ε)2y2x
)
(48)
+
1− ρ
2
(
py −
5S
4x
+
1
9S
ε2y2x
)
−
α
2
(x2 + y2)
Let ψi denote the partial derivative of ψ with respect to i, and ψij its cross-
partial derivative with respect to i and j. Then, the first order conditions for the
optimum human capital investments are
ψy ≡
1 + ρ
4
(
p+ ε+
1
2S
(p− ε)2yx
)
+
1− ρ
2
(
p+
2
9S
ε2yx
)
− αy = 0 (49)
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and
ψx ≡
1 + ρ
4
(
5S
4x2
+
1
4S
(p− ε)2y2
)
+
1− ρ
2
(
5S
4x2
+
1
9S
ε2y2
)
− αx = 0 (50)
Additionally, the following second order conditions have to be satisfied:
ψyy ≡
1 + ρ
8S
(p− ε)2x+
1− ρ
9S
ε2x− α < 0 (51)
ψxx ≡ −
3− ρ
4
5S
2x3
− α < 0 (52)
ψyyψxx − (ψyx)
2 > 0 (53)
where ψyx ≡
1+ρ
8S
(p− ε)2y + 1−ρ
9S
ε2y > 0.
Total differentiation then yields the following system of equations:
(
ψyy ψyx
ψyx ψxx
)(
dy
dx
)
+
(
ψyp ψyρ ψyS
ψxp ψxρ ψxS
)
dp
dρ
dS

 =
(
0
0
)
(54)
where
ψyp ≡
1 + ρ
4
(
1 +
1
S
(p− ε)yx
)
+
1− ρ
2
> 0 (55)
ψxp ≡
1 + ρ
8S
(p− ε)y2 > 0 (56)
ψyρ ≡
1
4
(
p+ ε+
1
2S
(p− ε)2yx
)
−
1
2
(
p+
2
9S
ε2yx
)
< 0 (57)
ψxρ ≡
1
4
(
5S
4x2
+
1
4S
(p− ε)2y2
)
−
1
2
(
5S
4x2
+
1
9S
ε2y2
)
< 0 (58)
ψyS ≡ −
1 + ρ
8S2
(p− ε)2yx−
1− ρ
9S2
ε2yx < 0 (59)
ψxS ≡
1 + ρ
4
(
5
4x2
−
1
4S2
(p− ε)2y2
)
+
1− ρ
2
(
5
4x2
−
1
9S2
ε2y2
)
(60)
With the exception of expressions (57) and (58), the above signs can be inferred
directly. To confirm the other two signs, rearrange (57) to
ψyρ ≡
p− ε
8S
[(p− ε)yx− S]−
1
8
(p− ε)−
1
9S
ε2yx < 0 (61)
By restriction (16), the term in brackets is negative, confirming the sign. Simi-
larly, rearranging (58) yields
ψxρ ≡
(p− ε)yx+ S
16Sx2
[(p− ε)yx− S]−
S
4x2
−
1
18S
ε2y2 < 0 (62)
With these results, we can proof:
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1. Complementarity of x and y follows from ψyx > 0.
2.
dy
dp
=
−ψypψxx + ψxpψyx
ψyyψxx − (ψyx)2
> 0 (63)
and
dx
dp
=
−ψxpψyy + ψypψyx
ψyyψxx − (ψyx)2
> 0 (64)
3.
dy
dρ
=
−ψyρψxx + ψxρψyx
ψyyψxx − (ψyx)2
< 0 (65)
and
dx
dρ
=
−ψxρψyy + ψyρψyx
ψyyψxx − (ψyx)2
< 0 (66)
4.
dy
dS
=
−ψySψxx + ψxSψyx
ψyyψxx − (ψyx)2
< 0 (67)
Here, the sign of dy
dS
is not obvious. However, rearranging the numerator
yields
−ψySψxx + ψxSψyx = ψySα
−ψyx
(
1 + ρ
16S2
(p− ε)2y2 +
1− ρ
18S2
ε2y2
)
(68)
−
3− ρ
4
5
4x2
(
1 + ρ
8S
(p− ε)2y +
1− ρ
9S
ε2y
)
such that dy
dS
< 0 is confirmed.
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